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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This action arises out of a claim by plaintiff for breach
of contract by defendant in the purchase of business assets.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COU^T
The case was tried to the Court, judgment entered in favor
of plaintiff and against defendant Ken Christopher, appellant, for
the sum of $4,750.00, together with $450.00 interest and $22.00
costs.

Defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment in

his favor as a matter of law or a new trial, if required.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, as seller, and J. C. Martin and Ken Christopher,
as purchasers, entered into an agreement (Exhibit 1) dated the
first of September, 1974.

Under that agreement Martin and

Christopher agreed to purchase certain equipment, trucks, and
accounts receivable as shown by Exhibit "A".

The agreement of

September 1 was not performed and after Martin and Christopher
had split up on the 22nd of January, 1975, Ken Christopher, the
appellant, and Town and Country Disposal, Inc. entered into an
agreement which is Exhibit 4.
Under Exhibit 4 plaintiff reserved all of its rights against
J. C. Martin.

Christopher was relieved from his obligations under

the agreement of September 1, 1974 and entered into the new
agreement, Exhibit 4.
Exhibit 4 provides for plaintiff to sell to defendant one
Leach Sani-Cruiser, monthly payments of $736.27 assumed, 52 trash
containers, monthly payments of $396.14 assumed, and the accounts
and business routes of plaintiff.

Defendant assumed the balance

owing by plaintiff to Leach Credit Corporation on the Sani-Cruiser,
to IDS Leasing Company on the trash containers, and agreed to pay
$4,750.00 for the accounts and business routes that plaintiff
had developed.
Dates were set up for the time when the payments were due.
One payment on the 6th of January, which is prior to the date of
the agreement, one payment due on the 19th of January, a date prior
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to the date of the agreement, and one payment due on the 22nd
of January, the day of the agreement.

Monthly installments were

to be paid thereafter on the three separate items.
This is no disagreement relating to the amounts paid by
defendant.

A list of payments is shown on Exhibit 5, a photostatic

copy of the Answers to Interrogatories prepared by defendant.
The list shows payments of $736.27 on July 19 and February 19,
1975, payments of $250.00 on January 22 and $397.00 on January 22.
Additional payments of $436.27 were made on March 3, 1975 and
$396.99 on March 3, 1975.

Defendant claims that as of the 6th of

March, 1975, his payments were current as far as the contract of
January 22, 1975 is concerned.

Plaintiff admits the payments on

equipment were current, but denies the payment on accounts was
paid.
Plaintiff claims that it served on defendant the notice,
plaintiff's Exhibit 9, notifying him as of February 25, 1975
that he was in default and that the equipment he was purchasing
would be taken back as of March 7, 1975.

Attached to the Complaint

is an additional notice claimed to have been served by the plaintiff
upon defendant.

It is dated February 27, 1975 and claims

repossession on or after the 6th of March, 1975.
Paragraph VII of the agreement of January 22, Exhibit 4,
contains a provision as to default by purchaser, the defendant.
It provides that notice by the plaintiff ^ould be given not less
than ten days prior to the date when seller intended to repossess
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and purchaser would be able to cure the defect in performance.
It also provided that should the purchaser fail to cure the defect,
then the balance owing for the purchase price of the business,
that is $4,750.00, would be due and would bear interest at the rate
of 10% per annum from and after the date of delinquency.
Plaintiff repossessed the Sani-Cruiser on the 7th day of
March.

Defendant Christopher delivered back to the plaintiff the

trash containers on or about the 28th day of March, 1975 and paid
no further sum on the contract balance.
The primary activity envisioned by parties was the
collecting of garbage by defendant.

It was necessary for the

business to operate that there would be the garbage truck and
the trash containers into which the garbage would be deposited.
Almost immediately following the January 22 agreement,
trouble began to occur.
Plaintiff continually claimed that the defendant was in
arrears in his payments and made repeated demands on him for
payments.

Defendant steadfastly claimed that he was current in

his contract.

Although the agreement did not provide or mention

the property insurance or public liability insurance, at the time
of trial plaintiff claimed that defendant could not provide
insurance and did not provide insurance and that, as a consequence,
financing arrangements contemplated by the parties for the trash
containers were never consummated.

Plaintiff had no purchase

agreement or right of possession to the 52 trash containers that
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it had agreed to sell to defendant.

(See R. 125, R. 163, R.164)

Defendant made the checks payable for the purchase price
of the containers to Atlas Equipment, plaintiff's officer Barry
Wickel, and the IDS Corporation.

A check dated January 22 with

IDS1 name on it, defendant discovered, was cashed by plaintiff
without the IDS endorsement (R. 163) . This money was retained
by plaintiff and has never been paid to anybody.
A cashier's check, Exhibit 6, dated January 23, 1975 for
$397.00 to be applied on the containers was not cashed.

Plaintiff

could not get the IDS endorsement and the failure to have the
proper endorsement was discovered before the check was paid.
Exhibit 6 is still uncashed (R. 161).
The discussions between plaintiff's officers
became more heated as time went on.

and defendant

Finally, on or about the

25th of February, the plaintiff claims it gave defendant notice
of default and of its intention to repossess its equipment.
of repossession is given as March 7, 1975.

Date

Defendant denies that

this notice was ever received by him (R. 203) . However, it is
undisputed that heated discussions occurred.

On the 6th of

March, 1975, an altercation occurred between defendant and Wickel,
President of plaintiff (R. 256).
A serious conflict in the evidence arises over Exhibit 9,
the notice of default.

Attached to the

Complaint was a notice

of default dated February 27, which the Complaint alleges is the
notice of default given to defendant.

This notice sets forth that

plaintiff would retake its equipment on March 6, 1975.
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On March 7,

1975, while the defendant was out on the garbage collecting
route, plaintiff1s employees waited until defendant was out of
the truck, jumped in it, and drove it away (R. 170). The
defendant immediately thereafter began to gather in the containers
covered by the agreement.

By March 28 he had returned them to

the possession of the plaintiff (R. 212).
At the time of trial, the Court awarded no deficiency on
the payment of the purchase price, but granted judgment against
the defendant for the price of the accounts and route in the
amount of $4,750.00 and then gave 107o interest on said amount
from and after the 29th of February, 1975.
Defendant answered the Complaint of plaintiff and alleged
that there was an unlawful repossession by plaintiff.

That the

repossession prevented him from performing the agreement of
January 22, 1975.

His position was that the action on the part

of the plaintiff effectively rescinded and terminated the
contractual relationship between the parties.
ARGUMENT
Point I.

The repossession by plaintiff of the Leach

Sani-Cruiser was unlawful.
Point II.

Plaintiff's failure to have any IDS agreement

excuses performance by defendant.

-6-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE REPOSSESSION OF THE LEACH SANI-CRUISER BY PLAINTIFF
WAS UNLAWFUL.
The evidence is undisputed that on the 7th of March, 1975,
the date that agents of plaintiff actually seized the Sani-Cruiser
from defendant, defendant was current in his payments on the
Sani-Cruiser.

Record shows that he paid every payment required

under the contract of January 22, 1975, and the Court so found.
Plaintiff had given notice, it claims.

It is difficult

to know whether or not the notice was dated the 27th of February,
1975 or the 25th of February, 1975, plaintiff having furnished
both notices.

Whichever date the notice is determined to be,

it was an unjustified and improper notice|of termination.

There

was no breach by the defendant of the terms of the contract on
the day of the notice.

In addition, defendant claims repossession

occurred without giving to the defendant the ten days which is
permitted by the agreement in which to rectify his delinquency,
if any.
Between the dates of the notice of delinquency and the
7th of March, there is no dispute that the agents of plaintiff
and defendant met.

Defendant had actually paid to agents of

plaintiff three payments, one of $300.00 on February 28, 1975,
one of $436.27 on March 3, 1975, and one of $396.99 on March 3,
1975, a total of $1,133.26.
acknowledged.

Receipt of these payments is

Plaintiff's answer on the payments is that they
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were to be applied to a prior obligation incurred under the
old contract.
It is defendant's position that the contract, Exhibit 4,
was a representation and agreement by plaintiff to sell an
operation that was interdependent.

Each of the various items

covered by the agreement depended upon the existence of the other.
All three items mentioned in the contract were necessary for the
defendant to perform the agreement.
All parties anticipated that defendant would have to have
the Leach Sani-Cruiser to pick up the garbage, that the containers
would be necessary for the various accounts to deposit the
garbage, and that the accounts themselves and routes would be
serviced only if the first two items of equipment could be used
by defendant.
When the plaintiff took from defendant the Sani-Cruiser,
it destroyed defendant's ability to perform the other portions
of the agreement and denied to him the income from which all
parties expected payment would be made on the three separate items
being purchased.
If the repossession of the Sani-Cruiser was wrongful and
unlawful, as defendant claims it was, then it is defendant's
position that plaintiff has wrongfully deprived him of the
necessary equipment to perform the agreement and cannot now claim
damages as awarded by the Court.

Defendant relies on the principle

of law enunciated by this Court in Zion's Property, Inc. v. Holt,
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538 P.2d 1319 (Utah) , to-wit:

"One party may not render it

difficult or impossible for the other to continue performance and
then take advantage of the nonperformance he has caused.11
v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 45 (Utah);

Fischer

Fleming v. Fleming-Felt Company,

323 P.2d 712, 7 Utah 2d 293; Haymore v. Levinson, 328 P.2d 307,
8 Utah 2d 66;

17A C.J.S., §468, pg. 638.

The rule is most clearly stated in Talbott v. Nibert,
167 Kan. 138, 206 P.2d 131, in the following language:
"The rule is clear and well settled, and founded in
absolute justice, that a party to a contract cannot
prevent performance by another and derive any benefit,
or escape any liability, from his d>wn failure to
perform a necessary condition. Dill v. Pope, 29 Kan.
289; National Supply Co. v. United Kansas Portland
Cement Co., 91 Kan. 509, 512, 138 P. 599; Briney v.
Toews, 150 Kan. 489, 495, 95 P.2d 355. And this is
the universal rule. 12 Am. Jur., Contracts §§381, 386;
2 C.J., Agency, §439, p. 772; 3 C.J.S., Agency §185;
13 C.J., Contracts, §§721, 722, 723; 17 C.J.S.,
Contracts, §§468, 469; Restatement, Contracts, §315.,f
It is submitted that the admission by plaintiff that the
payments on the truck and containers were current makes the
repossession a breach of contract by plairitiff and unlawful.

No

right to claim further performance or breach by defendant survived
the repossession.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO HAVE ANY IDS AGREEMENT EXCUSES
PERFORMANCE BY DEFENDANT.
It was discovered after January 22, 1975 that plaintiff
had no contract with IDS and that IDS would not finance the
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containers.

Plaintiff had no right to possession of said

containers or any agreement by which it could purchase the
containers (R. 125, R. 148, R. 163).
Plaintiff claims that this is because defendant could not
obtain insurance on the containers.

There is no evidence in the

record that insurance on the containers was required as a condition
of defendantfs performance.

The writings are silent on this score.

Regardless of whether or not the defendant was to blame
for the failure of IDS to agree to finance the containers or
plaintiff was to blame for such failure, by March 3 it had become
apparent that IDS was not going to finance the containers and the
payments that the defendant had made on the containers was being
diverted to other uses by plaintiff.
Two checks had been paid on the IDS account, one in the
amount of $397.00 and the other inthe amount of $396.99.

The one

check had actually been cashed by plaintiff without obtaining the
endorsement of IDS.

The other one was returned and is still

uncashed because IDS refuses to endorse the check.
It appeared that the containers were owned by George
Swanson of Swanson & Sons Company, and that neither the plaintiff,
defendant, nor IDS has any right whatsoever to said containers
(R. 125, R. 148, R. 163).
It is defendant's position then that in addition to the
wrongful repossession by the plaintiff of the Sani-Cruiser, the
plaintiff was unable, and it now appeared falsely represented,
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that it was able to sell and deliver a right of possession or
title to the containers necessary for defendant's garbage
collection operation.
It is defendant's position that when parties have contracted
in reliance upon a certain state of facts existing, and it develops
that the facts do not exist and that the parties have been mistaken
and the parties cannot accomplish the end that each anticipated
in the making of the contract, neither pa£ty is entitled to
damages for breach of contract.
Plaintiff claims the lack of insurance was discussed and
its lack of interest revealed to defendant, but signed an agreement
with language in it that clearly stated it had an agreement with
IDS.

Defendant submits the written document language must prevail

over oral recollection.
This Court, in Maw v. Weber Basin Water Conservancy District,
15 Utah 2d 271, 391 P.2d 300, recognized that where parties
contract for certain performance and a basic subject matter on
which performance depended no longer exists, parties are excused
from further performance.

The Court cited as authority for its

holding Parrish v. Stratton Cripple Creek Mining & Development Co.,
116 P.2d 207, Cert. Denied 61, S.Ct. 738, ftl2 U.S. 698, 85 L.Ed. 1132
The Court there held:
"While we find no Colorado decision on the point, it
is well settled by the adjudicated ceases in England
and the United States that where parties enter into a
contract on the assumption that some particular thing
essential to its performance will continue to exist
and be available for the purpose an4 neither agrees to
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be responsible for its continued existence and
availability, the contract must be regarded as
subject to an implied condition that if, without
the fault of either party, the particular thing
ceases to exist or be available for the purpose,
the contract shall be dissolved and the parties
excused from performing it.
M

Mr. Williston, in his Revised Edition of his work
on Contracts, §1948, states the principle as follows:
'Not only where a specific thing is itself to be sold
or transferred, but wherever a contract required for
its performance the existence of a specific thing,
the fortuitous destruction of that thing, or such
impairment of it as makes it unavailable, excuses
the promisor, unless he has clearly assumed the risk
of its continued existence,1 and cites Operators1
Oil Co. v. Barbre, 10 Cir., 65 F.2d 857, 861, 862,
where this court held that if performance is rendered
impossible by proceedings in a receivership of a third
party for which the promisor is in no wise responsible,
performance by the promisor is excused/1
See also Tulsa Opera House Co. v. Mitchell, 24 P.2d 997,
165 Okl. 61.
This doctrine is called the doctrine of impossibility
excusing performance and is cited and explained in Twin Harbours
Lumber Co. v. Carrico, 92 Idaho 343, 442 P.2d 753, in the following
language:
n

The doctrine of impossibility excusing performance
of a contractual obligation, insofar as relevant in
the present setting, provides generally that if by
express terms of a bargain or within the contemplation
of the bargaining parties the existence of a specific
thing is essentially necessary for the performance of
a promise in the bargain, 'a duty to perform the promise
* * * is discharged if the thing * * * subsequently is
not in existence in time for seasonable performance1." 1 1
"11. 2 Restatement, Contracts §460 (19,32). Accord
Parsons v. Bristol Development Co., 62 Cal.2d 861,
44 Cal.Rptr. 767, 402 P.2d 839 (1965); cf., Cannon v.
Huhndorf", 67 Wash.2d 778, 409 P.2d 865 (1966); United
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States v. Buffalo Coal Mining Company, 345 F.2d 517
(on denial of petition for rehearing) (9th Circ. 1865);
Foster v. Atlantic Refining Company, 329 F.2d 485,
(5th Cir. 1964); see generally Annot., Modern Status
of the Rules Regarding Impossibility of Performance as
Defense in Action for Breach of Contract, 84 A.L.R.2d 12,
§19, pp. 92."
The doctrine is also known as the doctrine of frustration.
See 17A C.J.S., §463(2), pg. 616.

Many cases are cited and the

Restatement of the Law of Contracts, §28$, quoted as follows:
I!

Where the assumed possibility of a desired object
or effect to be attained by either party to a contract
forms the basis on which both parties enter into it,
and this object or effect is or sorely will be frustrated,
a promisor who is without fault in causing the frustration,
and who is harmed thereby, is discharged from the duty
of performing his promise unless a contrary intention
appears."
Defendant submits that without a right to purchase the
containers for the garbage business and nb agreement with IDS,
performance by defendant of the contract is effectively frustrated.
The failure of plaintiff to have such an agreement or some right
to the containers certainly on January 22 could not have been
the responsibility of defendant.

It is respectfully submitted

that this failure on plaintiff's part excused performance by
defendant and

no judgment should have be^n awarded against him.
CONCLUSION

Defendant respectfully submits that the Court should reverse
the trial court and enter judgment in favc^r of defendant and
against the plaintiff and award his costs incurred.
Respectfully submitted,
DWIGHT L. KING
2121 Sc^uth State Street
Salt Ldke City, Utah 84115
Attorney for Ken Christopher,
Defendant-Appellant
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